00:00:03 Introduction of Amaury Séchet and Joannes Vermorel.
00:00:50 Defining economic cartels and Bitcoin use.
00:02:31 Bitcoin cartels’ evasion.
00:04:12 Cartels and supply chain perspective with examples.
00:07:54 Bitcoin aiding supply chain cooperation.
00:09:18 Bitcoin cartel dynamics and trust issues.
00:10:27 Cooperation principles in Bitcoin and supply chains.
00:12:37 Future supply chains: tight cooperation and trust.
00:13:23 Efficient resource pooling and challenges.
00:16:00 Bitcoin split due to differing visions.
00:16:37 Strategic interest for standardization in supply chains.
00:19:33 ‘Collusion’: when cooperation becomes problematic.
00:21:19 Price-fixing example: mobile phone operators.
00:23:31 Bitcoin in supply chains: cooperation engineering.
00:26:01 Engineered instability’s impact on system survival.
00:28:19 Tight cooperation in supply chains: pros and cons.
00:30:56 Betrayal within cartels and implications.
00:32:55 Bitcoin-like dynamics in future supply chains.
00:35:14 Bitcoin’s predictive value for supply chains.
Summary
In today’s episode, Kieran Chandler, Bitcoin ABC’s chief developer, Amaury Séchet, and Lokad’s founder, Joannes Vermorel, discuss the interplay of economic cartels within the Bitcoin ecosystem and supply chains. They are suggesting that cartels, traditionally perceived in a negative light, can foster efficiency through cooperation, while simultaneously nurturing instability. Employing Bitcoin as a case study, Séchet points out that miners establish a relationship that is both cooperative and competitive, one that could potentially fragment in the face of disagreement. Vermorel echoes this sentiment within supply chains, underlining the importance of trust and machine-level cooperation. They are introducing the concept that future supply chains might mirror Bitcoin’s dynamics, with real-time programmatic interactions bolstering efficiency. Séchet is accentuating the potential of the Bitcoin model to encourage a fresh economic perspective that extends beyond digital cash.
Extended Summary
The conversation kicks off with Kieran Chandler, the host, welcoming Amaury Séchet, the lead developer at Bitcoin ABC, and Joannes Vermorel, the founder of Lokad. They delve into the main theme of the discussion, economic cartels, focusing specifically on how these function within the Bitcoin ecosystem and in supply chains.
Séchet opens up by characterizing a cartel as a unique market scenario where competing entities opt to collaborate towards a common objective. He explains that this collaboration often stirs instability due to the competitive nature of the entities involved. He uses Bitcoin to illustrate his point, indicating that miners can be viewed as a kind of cartel. They compete to mine more blocks for higher revenue while simultaneously acknowledging each other’s blocks to construct the longest chain, an element that advantages all.
He further explains that although cartels commonly carry negative connotations, they can also establish efficiencies by eradicating certain aspects of competition. Nonetheless, they frequently exhibit instability due to the competitive nature of their members. This instability can lead the cartel to disintegrate if conditions shift, for example, when some miners decide against cooperation, leading to two separate versions of Bitcoin.
Vermorel then offers a supply chain viewpoint on cartels. He maintains that cartels are not invariably detrimental; the key resides in the type and extent of collaboration among the entities involved. He provides an example from the aerospace industry where rivals cooperate to source spare parts in the event of an Aircraft on Ground (AOG) incident. He contends that this form of collaboration benefits all parties, including the end consumers, as it boosts safety. He also emphasizes that while cartels are typically perceived as negative, they can lead to significant efficiencies under certain circumstances.
The dialogue shifts to the characteristics of cartels. Both Séchet and Vermorel concur that cartels are highly efficient but inherently unstable. However, Séchet highlights that this instability can generate a system of checks and balances, as the smaller members of a cartel can opt to depart if they perceive the larger members are acting against their interests.
Trust within a cartel is also examined, with Séchet claiming that the largest members typically steer the direction of a cartel but must keep smaller members content to ensure their continued participation. Vermorel adds that close, machine-level collaboration, as seen in Bitcoin, introduces a new level of cooperation that’s more detailed and intricate than traditional cartel collaboration.
In wrapping up, Vermorel touches upon the future of supply chains, suggesting there’s potential for entities to consolidate resources such as warehouses or truck fleets for greater efficiency through machine-driven protocols. Such an integrated system could potentially revolutionize the supply chain landscape.
The conversation begins by comparing the Bitcoin ecosystem to potential supply chain dynamics. Bitcoin is proposed as a real-world instance illustrating what might occur when various entities interact within a similar ecosystem. This comparison aims to project future trends in supply chain management, predicting a shift towards this type of dynamic within the next decade.
The interviewees debate how trust influences cooperative systems, using the potential fleets of autonomous cars as an example. They theorize that different actors might consolidate resources or facilities to achieve greater efficiency, given sufficient mutual trust. However, they also underscore the risk of this trust being broken by competitive actors who might be motivated to act selfishly, disrupting the equilibrium.
The participants delve into the issue of dividing or breaking within cooperative systems, using the Bitcoin hard fork (splitting into two separate currencies) as an example. They explore this concept within the supply chain context, arguing that disagreements over technology or standards can lead to fragmentation. They also suggest that competition both within and between such groups is crucial for progress, as complacency can result in displacement by more innovative competitors.
The discussion transitions to the concept of collusion versus cooperation. The interviewees assert that the distinction between these terms
is subjective and can depend on whether the actions taken serve the interests of the participating entities or lead to harmful consequences for outside parties. They also explore the idea that the free market has a self-correcting mechanism against harmful collusion, as long as it remains open to new entrants. In contrast, regulated or monopolistic markets can harbor negative forms of collusion unchecked.
Vermorel suggests that Bitcoin and future supply chain systems share similar dynamics. He postulates that these systems would benefit from “engineered instability,” a concept derived from scientific observations where a system, once deviating from its equilibrium state, tends to deviate more unless returned to balance. This instability keeps everyone involved vigilant, thus prolonging the longevity of the system or “cartel,” as they term it.
In this context, a cartel is not perceived negatively as in traditional economic perspectives. Instead, it refers to a group of actors cooperating tightly, somewhat akin to Bitcoin miners, who collectively contribute to the overall health of the system while benefiting individually.
The participants discuss the pitfalls and benefits of such cooperation. The positive aspects include increased efficiency and longevity of the system, while the downside is the potential for defection or betrayal within the cartel. This latter scenario could occur when an actor breaks from the cooperative pattern to seize a competitive advantage.
Such a tightly-knit collaboration can lead to drama, which has been observed in the Bitcoin ecosystem. Vermorel suggests that this sort of public tension, while creating discord, also encourages transparency and influence, making the discussions about the direction of the ecosystem very public.
In terms of the future, Vermorel envisions supply chain systems mirroring the dynamics of Bitcoin. He anticipates a future where programmatic real-time interactions play out similarly to how Bitcoin miners interact with each other. These future supply chains would possess an equilibrium, with incentives engineered to promote cooperation and prevent defection.
This future, according to Vermorel, could also see supply chain management becoming more transparent and publicly-discussed, contrasting with current practices which tend to be more secretive.
Séchet, aligning with Vermorel’s vision, emphasizes that Bitcoin’s innovation extends beyond decentralizing digital cash. It also lies in innovatively structuring incentives within a cartel to foster cooperation. He predicts this model to influence other areas in the future, marking just the beginning of a new economic perspective.
Full Transcript
Kieran Chandler: Today, I’m delighted to say we’re joined by Amaury Séchet, Lead Developer at Bitcoin ABC, and arguably one of the most prominent experts in the world of bitcoins. About a year ago, Amory and his team at Bitcoin ABC prevented Bitcoin from running into major operational problems. Today, we’re going to be talking about economic cartels. Also, I’m joined by Joannes Vermorel, the CEO of Lokad. So, gentlemen, I feel like I have my hands a little bit full today, but thanks very much for joining us. Put simply, a cartel is a type of market where the participants not only compete, but they also cooperate. So, Emery, let’s kick things off with you. Could you define for us exactly what cartels are and how they relate to bitcoins?
Amaury Séchet: Sure. A cartel represents an odd market situation where you have a set of actors who are essentially competitors but choose to cooperate for certain reasons. This creates a strange association of individuals who cooperate, yet at the same time, the situation is inherently unstable because they are competitors. It may seem uncommon, but it’s actually a widespread economic situation. Cartels exist in various sectors, with the most apparent instances found in drug trafficking or telecommunications markets.
As for Bitcoin, the miners are somewhat of a cartel. They are competitive, each aiming to mine more blocks than the other to increase their revenue. Yet, they accept each other’s blocks because it aids them in maintaining the longest chain with the most proof of work. Hence, they find themselves in a situation where they have to cooperate to build that chain while competing with each other to secure as many blocks as possible within that chain. This puts us in a typical cartel situation.
Kieran Chandler: That’s interesting, but I thought the whole point of Bitcoin is about economic freedom. Why are we still discussing Bitcoin and cartels in the same breath?
Amaury Séchet: Well, cartel formation isn’t always a negative thing. Often, members of a cartel lobby the government to prevent anyone outside the cartel from competing with them. A classic example would be mobile phone providers in most countries, where licenses are expensive. This scenario limits new entrants, creating a de facto cartel where there’s limited external competition.
On the free market, cartels naturally have an “escape hatch” where if the market isn’t working for them anymore, they can just disassociate from the cartel. This phenomenon was evident in Bitcoin in August last year when a set of miners stopped cooperating with each other and started building on different chains. As a result, we now have multiple versions of Bitcoin. Initially, we had one cartel of miners building on one chain. Now, we have at least two significant ones operating on different versions and no longer cooperating with each other.
People are not that familiar with this aspect as they’re used to government-enabled cartels, but it doesn’t always have to be the case.
Kieran Chandler: And Joannes, what about from a supply chain perspective? Are there cartels in supply chains as well?
Joannes Vermorel: Yes, there are, but the term ‘cartel’ is often negatively connotated, primarily as it’s considered illegal in many instances. It’s crucial to understand why cartels are typically deemed illegal. In a cartel, we have both competition, as Emery outlined, and cooperation. The most common form of cooperation is price-fixing, which is often frowned upon.
Basically, Europe just had, I think, the largest fine ever for the cartel of elevators. It was something like 1.4 billion euros of payment due for essentially a cartel-like structure among four companies who were doing price-fixing. Price-fixing is generally recognized as very bad because it only profits the people in the cartel, with no positive side effects for the market at large.
Now what interests me a lot about Bitcoin, because I think it illustrates some interesting properties that might become the future of supply chain, is when you have very tight cooperation and you have very good emergent properties for the market at large. The point is, cooperating is not all bad. If you cooperate in a way that people who are outside the cartel benefit from it, it’s not like everyone is a loser and the people within the cartel are the winners.
To illustrate this in the supply chain, for example, take the aerospace industry. An airline is going to buy a part from another airline and the other airline is going to sell this part at a steep price. However, the airline won’t buy from just anyone. They will only source from a short list of airlines.
You have this very cartel-like situation where you have very tight cooperation. People cooperate to keep the aircraft flying all the time, even though they are competitors. They don’t accept just anyone in the club, but they have a good reason for that: safety. As an occasional traveler, you benefit from this cartel in the form of security. It’s not all bad. The progress the aerospace industry has made in terms of safety is incredible, and it’s due to this type of cooperation.
Kieran Chandler: Amaury, have you got any more properties of a cartel that you could highlight?
Amaury Séchet: On the economic front, cartels are unstable because the members of the cartel are competitors. If anything disrupts the status quo, the cartel can dissolve. But cartels can also be highly efficient. There is a ton of inefficiency that arises from competition between actors that can be eliminated if they choose to cooperate. Usually, the people in the cartel benefit from that, but most of the time, the customers also benefit, like in the airplane example Joannes gave.
Cartels are not bad per se. They can be more efficient, which is an upside that is often overlooked. The downside is inherent instability.
Kieran Chandler: The upside is high efficiency and the downside is inherent instability. Can we trust the people in cartels, in the context of Bitcoin?
Amaury Séchet: I think we can. Another characteristic of cartels is that the biggest members tend to control the direction of the cartel, while the smaller members don’t have that much influence.
Kieran Chandler: It’s understood that certain degrees of centralization are inherent due to the fact that the biggest miner is going to have a disproportionate influence on the general direction of the project. However, this means they need to do so in a manner that the smaller miners are kept happy, or at least sufficiently so. If the biggest member of the network decides to act against the interests of the smaller ones, it becomes in their interest to leave the network and split off.
Joannes, can you share your thoughts on how this trust can be created?
Joannes Vermorel: Yes, it’s very interesting to shed light on how this is relevant not just to Bitcoin, but also to supply chain management. The cooperation within Bitcoin is incredibly tight; it’s literally software that has to be completely compatible or else you risk a fork. This brings a whole new level of cooperation that goes beyond the old-school idea of simply agreeing on a price. This degree of cooperation is far greater than traditional business alliances.
If you think about the future of supply chain management, many resources can be pooled. For instance, if you have a fleet of trucks—or perhaps autonomous trucks in the future—that you’re not using, you might lend them to your competitor. This way, instead of duplicating infrastructure, there can be a machine-level cooperation with real-time, computer-driven protocols to have everything completely tightly organized. This would result in radical efficiencies in terms of inventory and transport capacity allocation.
This brings us back to the concept of trust. If you have a leader, like Amazon, who’s leading this kind of super tightly integrated supply chain with machine protocols, we must consider the dynamics of this ecosystem. This is where I find the comparison to Bitcoin particularly illustrative—it gives us a good example of the sort of human dynamics that can be expected once supply chains reach this level of integration. I think supply chains are not there yet, but maybe they will be in ten years. What are your thoughts on this, Amaury?
Amaury Séchet: I agree, it seems like many people are considering this idea from various perspectives. If we take things like the developments in self-driving technology to their logical conclusion, we’ll see fleets of autonomous vehicles in large cities that people share and pay for according to their usage. And that’s just a miniaturized version of what you’re suggesting. The same principle could apply to airplane parts or transport between factories and retailers or e-commerce facilities. The increasing autonomy brought by technology can foster cooperation between different actors in the supply chain. There is a lot of potential in this area.
Kieran Chandler: So as long as the different actors involved in an operation trust each other enough, things work, and efficiency is high. However, trust can easily be broken. It’s plausible that some actors may have incentives to undermine others, especially if they’re competitors. What you’re suggesting is that a very efficient economic situation requires everyone to trust each other and play fair. But we must remember that these actors may, at some point, be driven to betray other actors. Can you clarify what you mean by an “incentive to screw our actors”?
Joannes Vermorel: The incentive to undermine or betray others could manifest as selfish actions detrimental to the rest of the group. The important players in the operation need to ensure that everyone has a stronger incentive to cooperate rather than compete. However, people make mistakes and it’s inevitable that someone may disrupt the harmony. That’s just the nature of the market.
Kieran Chandler: So, you’re essentially saying that the nature of an economic cartel in a Bitcoin environment is that everyone knows, at some point, someone’s going to disrupt the equilibrium?
Amaury Séchet: Well, it’s a possibility. Someone might undermine others or there could just be disagreements about what’s best for the group. It’s not necessarily malicious. Different visions of what is best can emerge, and we’ve seen this happen. For instance, in August last year, Bitcoin split into Bitcoin Cash due to different groups wanting to take different directions. At some point, the incentive to cooperate becomes smaller than the incentive to compete, and then competition begins. When that happens, the cartel dissolves.
Kieran Chandler: So Joannes, in terms of supply chain perspectives, have there been instances where such splits have occurred? Any examples?
Joannes Vermorel: Yes, supply chains are often rife with situations where things could potentially get standardized, but there’s always a strategic interest to make a certain technology your standard and try to influence the market. It could happen with RFID, QR codes, even barcodes. Everyone has a shared interest in using the same sort of barcodes, for example, but if a vendor can gain enough traction, they may introduce their own system with additional features. Amaury is right; it’s not always about having a larger market share. Disagreements about the direction of the technology can also occur. For instance, if there’s a disagreement about how much information a barcode should hold, people may not agree on the right path. Everyone in a cartel must feel that their relevance will persist even if the whole cartel collapses.
Kieran Chandler: But I suppose in supply chains, if the people in charge of barcodes, say GS1 for instance, stop being competitive, another group using RFIDs could simply replace them. So there’s competition within the cartel, but there’s also competition from the external world. If you’re not constantly progressing, you could be replaced by another cartel that approaches the same problem from a different angle and displaces you entirely. In supply chains, we see this with different types of standardization, like barcodes versus RFIDs. These systems have some connections, but fundamentally, they are quite different.
Joannes Vermorel: That’s correct.
Kieran Chandler: Sometimes, there is a standard that is extremely sticky, like the size of a container for example. The size of a container has an extremely stable standardization. It’s very hard for people to deviate from that because there is so much existing infrastructure, such as boats and harbours, made for that specific standard. However, if there’s an incredibly good use case for a very different standard, it might happen. And if nobody wants to agree on that, somebody might actually capture a portion of the market with this new standard.
Okay, so we’ve spoken a lot about this tight cooperation. Let’s introduce a new word now: collusion. Where does this tight cooperation stop and become collusion? Collusion is illegal, it’s not a great thing, right? I mean, there’s got to be some line, but where is it?
Amaury Séchet: The difference between cooperation and collusion is mostly artificial. It comes down to the fact that it’s the same behavior. Maybe collusion is when it starts to be in the interest of people interacting in the cartel, probably. For instance, let’s take the example of mobile phone operators. If they agree with each other to set very high prices, they can do that because nobody else can get on the market. Then they’re in a situation where they’re not being more efficient economically, but they’re taking advantage of everyone else. So, in those cases, you could use the term collusion, but it’s very much a judgment of value.
Kieran Chandler: And value is inherently subjective, so what is cooperation and what is collusion can be a very grey area.
Amaury Séchet: Exactly, it’s very subjective. But those negative ways of cooperating don’t exist on the free market to the extent that they exist on a managed market, because you can have new entrants. If you do price-fixing to have very high prices, this is actually what happened in France with Free Mobile a few years ago. We had three operators who agreed with each other to have high prices. Then a fourth operator entered the market, with very strong incentive not to join the cartel. If that operator doesn’t join the cartel, it can undercut the other operators by a significant margin and gain a lot of market share very quickly.
Kieran Chandler: So, it’s basically creating a type of competition?
Amaury Séchet: Yes, because that new entrant, if they decide not to join the cartel, can have an offer that is significantly more attractive for customers, and thus they become a major actor in the market very quickly. If the market isn’t locked down and new entrants can join, or if members of the cartel are free to leave the cartel, then you end up with a self-correcting mechanism. But it’s not the case when, say, the government requires you to have a license to operate in a specific field of work. In that case, it’s not possible for anybody else to come in and compete. This is the case for banks, or taxis for instance. So, you end up with a banking cartel or a taxi cartel that is resistant to cooperation. You get these negative effects mostly when the cartel is enforced by law or by incentives created by law, more than when they occur economically naturally.
Kieran Chandler: Interesting. Joannes, do you have anything to add here?
Joannes Vermorel: Yes, I think one of the very interesting angles from Bitcoin for supply chain is that you can engineer, in my perception, to some extent.
Kieran Chandler: The cooperation framework is designed to reinforce positive cooperation instead of negative collusion. For example, in Bitcoin, you push a transaction that comes with a transaction fee to pay a miner. Any miner can decide to reject it because the fee is too low, so they could try to push up the price. The problem is, any other miner can just pick up the transaction and include it in their block ten minutes later. Therefore, it’s difficult, though not impossible, for miners to agree on high transaction fees.
Amaury Séchet: It’s very similar to the mobile phone industry. They could agree to push the price very high, but as the price increases, individual actors have a stronger incentive to break away from the cartel.
Joannes Vermorel: In Bitcoin, the system is designed to be more efficient than switching mobile operators, which can take hours and involves significant friction cost. Laws have been passed to prevent complications for clients due to the limited number of actors. But if the mobile market were engineered like Bitcoin, there would be a real-time auction for my carrier every time I made a phone call. The lowest bid would take it, creating more instability for any potential cartel.
Amaury Séchet: This concept of engineered instability could be beneficial for future highly cooperative supply chain systems. Engineering instability into the system might increase the chances of the cartel surviving longer.
Kieran Chandler: That’s an interesting concept, engineering instability. But surely nobody would actually try to implement that into their systems.
Amaury Séchet: If the system is unstable in a scientific way, it means it will naturally deviate from its equilibrium state. If it’s a stable system, it will naturally return to its equilibrium state. However, an unstable system will continue to deviate further and further from its equilibrium state unless actively corrected. The more unstable the cartel, the quicker it can dissolve. A very stable cartel can continue for quite some time before dissolving. By that point, it might be too late to do anything about it. If the cartel is unstable, it creates a situation where members must behave appropriately because the system could stop working quite immediately.
Joannes Vermorel: Exactly. If the cartel is more unstable, it gives members a stronger incentive to behave correctly, potentially prolonging the cartel’s existence.
Kieran Chandler: So we’ve spoken a lot here about the benefits of tight cooperation, such as improved efficiency. What about the negatives? Are there any negatives we should discuss?
Joannes Vermorel: Yes, for the future designs of these tightly cooperating supply chain frameworks, we can expect a lot of drama.
Kieran Chandler: Welcome. The Bitcoin ecosystem is known for never being short of drama. Wouldn’t you agree?
Joannes Vermorel: That’s correct. Much like cartels of old, there’s a lot of secret discussions and price-fixing that benefits no one. Consider companies like those manufacturing elevators who’ve been fined by Europe, they never stated their position on the matter publicly. However, in a system where people strive to do things for the greater good, they tend to be vocal about it, like in the Bitcoin ecosystem.
Kieran Chandler: Interesting. Could you elaborate on this point?
Joannes Vermorel: Certainly. Most of the decision-making happens in public, which leads to continuous intense drama. For instance, consider Apple’s decision to launch the iPhone. We can imagine multiple meetings, probably with disagreements and heated discussions, that contributed to the final design. Unlike traditional supply chains where discussions happen behind closed doors, the Bitcoin ecosystem thrives on public discourse. This level of public visibility could be the new norm, as it can influence the dynamics within the ecosystem.
Kieran Chandler: How does this public visibility work in the Bitcoin ecosystem?
Joannes Vermorel: Public visibility isn’t just about economic power. If you have a substantial media audience, that’s another form of power. It’s an opportunity to exert influence.
Kieran Chandler: Amaury, would you like to comment on the ongoing state of the community, from your perspective as a Bitcoin expert?
Amaury Séchet: Absolutely. We have a set of actors who are essentially competitors but cooperation can be beneficial for all. So, yes, expect plenty of drama. The media thrives on the Bitcoin-related dramas, which can be quite entertaining.
Kieran Chandler: Speaking of drama, Joannes, you mentioned the potential for betrayal within a cartel. Could you explain what you meant by that?
Joannes Vermorel: Sure. In a cartel where price-fixing is the norm, there’s an inherent incentive to cooperate. But it’s also a prisoner’s dilemma situation. If an actor decides to defect from the cartel and offer much lower prices, they can attract a large customer base from their competitors. The group as a whole benefits from cooperation, but individual actors may see more benefit in defection. The more outrageous the price-fixing, the stronger the incentive to defect.
Kieran Chandler: It sounds like cartels are quite unstable.
Joannes Vermorel: That’s accurate. Over time, the influence of a cartel grows, but so does the incentive for some actors to defect.
Kieran Chandler: As we start to wrap up, I’d like to ask about the future. Joannes, how do you see cartels affecting the future of supply chains?
Joannes Vermorel: I envision the future of supply chains to mirror the economic dynamics observed in Bitcoin. It is a live economical system with real agents interacting programmatically in real-time. The future of supply chains will likely evolve in a similar direction.
Kieran Chandler: There are very market-like dynamics exhibited within the Bitcoin mining cartel, both internally and externally. I expect that supply chain systems will have similar dynamics in the future, although it might take a decade or two to get there. Protocols and rules have to be defined, incentives engineered, so that the system can last and retain external trust. Even if people within the cartel come and go, the external world can still trust the collective cartel to fulfill its proposed value proposition. In the supply chain, this involves transportation, collaborative inventory management, and resource allocation. As we develop more capabilities like additive manufacturing, things that can be manufactured on demand, there might be a shift to renting capacity, like renting the printing capacity of a competitor for your own needs. There are areas for programmatic competition and turn competition. So, in my view, these systems will emerge. My advice to the supply chain audience is to anticipate what will happen by closely observing what is currently happening in Bitcoin, because it’s just the future that’s not evenly distributed yet. That’s what people can expect. What’s happening in Bitcoin today is what the supply chain will be like in two decades. Joannes, do you have any thoughts on this?
Joannes Vermorel: You make a compelling case, Kieran. I believe that understanding the mechanics and dynamics currently playing out in Bitcoin can indeed offer valuable insights for the supply chain sector. For instance, the idea of renting out the additive manufacturing capabilities of competitors could introduce fascinating dynamics and opportunities for collaboration and competition in the market.
Kieran Chandler: Absolutely. And what about you, Amaury? Any closing thoughts on Bitcoin’s potential global impact?
Amaury Séchet: I agree with both of you. Bitcoin is not just money, it’s a technological innovation with significant implications for various aspects of the economy and society, including the supply chain. I particularly agree with Joannes about the innovative incentives built into Bitcoin. Many people shy away from discussing it as a kind of ‘cartel’ due to the negative connotations of the term, but if you examine it dispassionately, it’s a fascinating and novel form of economic organization. Bitcoin represents a kind of cartel where incentives are engineered to keep participants closely aligned and cooperating with each other. It’s likely we will see these dynamics replicated in other areas as well.
Kieran Chandler: That’s an interesting perspective, Amaury. It seems we’re just at the beginning of realizing the potential of these new forms of economic structures and incentives. Thank you both for your insightful views. As always, we invite our viewers to engage with us. If you have any questions or comments, please leave them below. We’re here to foster open debate and to answer your questions. Thanks for watching, and we’ll see you next time. Goodbye.
